Introduction
HIV testing and counseling (HTC) is a gateway to improving prevention and care efforts, and has become a core strategy for decreasing HIV transmission and incidence (Glick, 2005) .
There have been calls to devote more resources to couple HTC since HIV transmission is highest in discordant couples, i.e. couples in which only one of the partners is infected, especially if the infected partner either does not know his or her status or has not revealed it to the uninfected partner (Padian et al., 1993) . Recent evidence demonstrates that antiretroviral treatment (ART) of HIV+ individuals is very effective in preventing transmission of the HIV virus within couples (Cohen et al., 2011; Dodd et al., 2010; El-Sadr et al., 2010; Wagner et al., 2010) . As a result, HTC couple testing, especially among discordant couples, has become a key component of prevention programs in generalized epidemic countries.
Despite the promise of HTC to reduce HIV transmission and the large amount of development assistance for HIV/AIDS, HTC uptake has only recently seen modest improvements (United Nations, 2011) . Moreover, there are few documented successful experiences of HTC programs reaching couples (Padian et al., 1993; Painter, 2001 ).
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A promising, yet largely untested, intervention to increase testing is to pay health providers for increasing participation in HTC. This is part of the more general Pay-forperformance (P4P) movement that gives financial rewards at the facility and/or provider levels to improve performance measured by specific utilization and quality of care indicators. P4P is now being piloted or scaled up in over 20 low-and middle-income countries (Eichler and Levine, 2009; Meessen et al., 2011) .
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the impact of Rwanda's national P4P scheme on individual and couple HTC. Building on the lessons from pilot experiences in a few provinces, Rwanda initiated in 2006 a national P4P scheme at the health center level to improve health services delivery, including HIV/AIDS services. We use data from a prospective impact evaluation we nested into the national scale-up of P4P in Rwanda, producing evidence from an 3 impact evaluation at scale with more external validity than closely monitored pilot experiments.
The Rwanda P4P scheme provided larger payment for couple HTC than for individual HTC, allowing us to explicitly test whether supply-side incentives are an effective intervention to increase couple HTC and in particular for discordant couples among whom the risk of HIV transmission is higher.
An important aspect of our study is the identification of the incentives' effects. P4P affects health care provision in two ways: first, through incentives for providers to expend more effort in specific activities and second through an increase in the amount of financial resources available to the health center. In order to identify the incentive effect separately from the increase in resources, the traditional input-based budgets of the comparison group were increased by the average amount of incentive payments to treatment facilities. As a result, while treatment and comparison facilities had the same financial resources available, a portion of the treatment facilities' budgets was determined based on their performance whereas the comparison facilities' resources were not. This is important because if P4P achieves its results just from increased financial resources, then the same results could be achieved from a simple increase in budget without incurring the administrative costs associated with implementing the incentive scheme.
Our results show a positive impact of P4P with an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the probability of individuals having ever been tested. However, when disaggregated by couple status we find that all of the results are driven by individuals living in a couple. There is no effect on single individuals even when we condition on being sexually active. However, there is a positive and statistically significant impact of 10.2 percentage points for individuals in couples, which amounts to a 14.5% increase over the control group testing rate. The impact of P4P on couple testing is particularly strong among discordant couples (i.e. one partner is confirmed HIV+ and the other is not), encouraging the partners of identified HIV patients to come for HTC.
These results are consistent with the fact that the Rwanda P4P strongly encouraged couple and partner testing, paying US$ 0.92 per new individual tested for HIV and US$ 4.59 per couple/partner jointly tested.
These results show that incentive payments are an effective means of increasing participation in HTC. They are especially important for Sub-Saharan Africa, where nearly 80% of HIV-infected adults are unaware of their HIV status and over 90% do not know whether their 4 partners are infected (World Health Organization, 2009 ). With only 12% of the global population, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 68% of all people living with HIV.
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Our findings contribute to the limited but growing evidence base that paying health facilities for performance is a feasible and effective method for improving health system performance in low-and middle-income countries. Our work contributes to the general literature on P4P in medical care, as it is the first to examine the impact of P4P incentives on HIV related services.
3 More importantly, the role of incentives in P4P is key. Because the comparison facilities' regular budgets were increased by an amount equal to the P4P payment to the treatment group, we were able to isolate the P4P incentive effect from the resource effect.
Our work also contributes to the relatively small literature on the effects of paying medical care providers for performance in developing countries. 4 There are four well-identified and related evaluations in other low-and middle-income countries. Hospital-based physicians in the Philippines who received extra bonus pay based in part on knowledge of appropriate clinical procedures reported increases in clinical knowledge (Peabody et al., 2011) .. In Indonesia, performance incentives to villages for improvements in health outcomes led to an increase in labor supply from health providers (Olken et al., 2012) . Miller et al. (2012) found that bonus payments to schools significantly reduced anemia among students in China. Finally, using the same identification strategy as this study, Basinga et al. (2011) found in Rwanda that P4P had significant positive impact on institutional deliveries and preventive care visits by young children, and improved quality of prenatal care, but found no effect on the number of prenatal care visits or on immunization rates. A follow-on study also reported large impacts on child health outcomes and provider productivity (Gertler and Vermeersch, 2012) .
2 In 2011 an estimated 34 million people were living with HIV worldwide, the number of AIDS-related deaths was 1.7 million and there were 2.5 million new HIV infections (UNAIDS, 2012) . 3 See Witter et al. (2011) for a recent systematic review of health care performance incentives in low-and middleincome countries. Most of the literature that they cite do not have control groups and estimate the impact of P4P as jumps in time trends of the amount of services providers by treatment facilities. 4 There is, however, a growing literature on P4P for medical care in the U.S. and other high-income countries with mixed results. See (Alshamsan et al., 2010; Scott et al., 2011; Van Herck et al., 2010) .
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the context of the health sector in Rwanda and the P4P intervention evaluated. In section 3, we present our data and we describe our identification strategy. Section 4 presents our results while section 5 concludes. 
The health sector in

Impact evaluation design, data and baseline characteristics
Impact evaluation design
The evaluation design with sample sizes is presented in Figure 1 . The evaluation design took advantage of the phased implementation of the program at the district level. Administrative districts with pre-existing NGO P4P pilot schemes were excluded from the sampling frame. The remaining districts were then grouped into eight blocks based on similar characteristics for rainfall, population density, and predominant livelihoods using data from the 2002 Census blocks included between two and four districts depending on characteristics and size. Facilities within each district within each block were then randomly assigned into the treatment group and the other into the comparison group.
Prior to implementation of the baseline survey, the administrative district boundaries were redrawn in the context of a decentralization effort (MINALOC (Ministry of Local Government), 2006). As a result, some of the experimental areas were combined with areas that already had the NGO run pilot P4P schemes. Because P4P could not be "removed" from health facilities that were already implementing the system, and because P4P was managed at the district level, the GoR required that all facilities within those new districts be in the first phase (treatment) of the rollout. This led the evaluation team to switch the assignment of treatment and comparison for eight districts from four blocks, as well as add one block to the sample. In the end, the study's nine blocks include 16 districts in total, of which 9 belonged to the treatment group and 7 to the comparison group. Facilities that had P4P prior to the study were excluded from the evaluation (Vermeersch et al., 2010) . Only facilities offering HIV/AIDS services were included in the HIV/AIDS P4P model. The 24 facilities that offered HIV services in these districts were enrolled in the study, with 10 facilities in the treatment and 14 facilities in the comparison group. Since a primary objective of the evaluation was to isolate the P4P incentive effect separately from the effect of an increase in financial resources, it was necessary to hold the level of resources constant across treatment and comparison facilities. To accomplish this, comparison facilities' traditional input-based budgets were increased by the average amount of P4P payments to treatment facilities on a quarterly basis during the experiment. Therefore, the differences in outcomes between the two groups at follow-up must be attributed to the difference in incentive structures and not to a difference in available financial resources.
Data
We conducted a baseline survey of the facilities from August until November 2006 and a follow-up survey from April until July 2008. 5 We also designed a household level survey that was administered to a sample of 1,000 households with an HIV+ positive member, and 600 randomly sampled neighbor households in the catchment area of the facility. We identified HIV/AIDS patients either by contacting the health facility where they received care or via association of PLWHA. We selected them randomly proportional to the number of HIV/AIDS patients attending each facility. We obtained informed consent from the patients before interviewing their household. In the follow-up survey, 85 percent of the baseline households were re-interviewed. The rate of attrition from the baseline sample was not statistically different between the treatment and comparison groups (15 percent each).
The outcome measures are constructed using data from the household surveys. The For the analysis of couple testing, we create an indicator using the question of whether or not the most recent sexual partners the respondents had in the 12 months prior to the survey had ever been tested for HIV. We further combine the responses about each respondent's individual testing and the testing of their sexual partners to create an indicator variable for whether both partners in the couple/sexual partnership have ever been tested. We then restrict the sample to individuals living with their sexual partners and who self-reported having had sex in the 12 months prior to the survey. For this analysis, the unit of observation is the couple and we include only one report by couple to avoid double-counting. For the analysis of HTC at the individual level, the sample consists of all adults aged 15
Summary statistics and balance at baseline
and above who were identified as HIV negative: 438 in the treatment group and 445 in the comparison group. Table 3 reports the baseline characteristics of all respondents grouped and by marital status 6 . There are no statistical differences in baseline means of the outcome variable "ever been tested". For the control variables used in the regression models, the samples are generally well balanced. All samples and sub-samples are well balanced in terms of sexual activity, marital status and assets values. The proportion of individuals whose partner is identified as HIV patient is also well balanced so that the proportion of discordant couples 7 , i.e. a couple where one partner is identified as an HIV patient and one is not, is well balanced across treatment and control.
For the analysis of HTC at the couple level, the sample consists of all adults aged 15 and above who were identified as HIV negative, who self-reported having had sex in the 12 months preceding the survey, and living with their sexual partners: 179 in the treatment group and 180 in the comparison group. Table 4 reports the baseline characteristics of respondents. There are no statistical differences in baseline means of the 3 outcome variables: "has the respondent ever been tested", "has the sexual partner of the respondent ever been tested" and "have the respondent and his/her sexual partner ever been tested". The only difference is that, overall, respondents in the control group are about 3 years older than those in treatment group. All other variables including education and asset value are well balanced.
Estimation
Given the reassignment of districts between the treatment and comparison groups before the start of the study, and the limited number of districts that could be assigned to the treatment and comparison groups, we view our study as quasi-experimental. While the sample is balanced at baseline on outcomes and characteristics, it is possible that the reassignment of districts was correlated with something unobservable to us and related to health outcomes. However, redrawing of administrative units took place within the context of a decentralization agenda that was led by the Ministry of Local Government, and we find no evidence that it was driven by or related to health outcomes (MINALOC (Ministry of Local Government), 2006). 8 Therefore, we think it is likely that any relevant unobservable factors were likely to be invariant over the time period of the intervention.
Therefore, we will use the difference-in-differences method that controls for unobserved time invariant characteristics. 9 This method compares the change in outcomes in the treatment group to the change in outcomes in the comparison group. By comparing changes, we control for observed and unobserved time invariant characteristics as well as for time-varying factors that are common to the treatment and comparison groups. As we discussed above, the final assignment to the treatment and comparison groups is orthogonal to pre-intervention observable variables, leading us to believe that there is likely no correlation between this assignment and unobservables that would drive program effects.
8 According to MINALOC (Ministry of Local Government) (2006), the objective of the decentralization was to enhance institutional development and capacity building for responsive local governance, to develop efficient, transparent and accountable fiscal and financial management systems at local government and grassroots levels. 9 An alternative, sometimes used in the literature, is the intent to treat estimator that compares the originally assigned treatments to controls. In this case, however, we would have misassigned 40% of the observations and would be grossly underpowered. Also, all of the examples we could find use the ITT in cases where the study entered the field intending to implement the original design and where behavioral choices by the study participants compromised the study design. In our case, the design was changed before we entered the field and was not compromised by the study participants. Hence, while our difference in difference estimator requires stronger assumptions, we believe that it is appropriate in terms of identification and is valid based on the balance tests and knowledge of the institutional context that drove the change in design. In our view, the difference in difference choice maximizes potential power without sacrificing internal validity. Table 5 reports the estimated P4P program impacts on HTC outcomes using the individual as the unit of analysis. We present analyses for the entire sample and then conduct sub-group analyses by marital status. In all of the estimated models, we control for age, education, and household assets and for gender and marital status when relevant. Assets are measured as the value of land, durables in the house, farm animals, farm equipment, and microenterprise equipment.
Results
In column (1) of table 5, we find a positive and statistically significant impact at the 10% level of 6.1 percentage points in the probability to have ever been tested with respect to the comparison group. This represents a 10.6 percent increase over the control group. When we restrict the sample to individuals living in a couple (column 2), we find a positive impact of 10.2 percentage points that is statistically significant at the 5% level, representing a 14.5 percent increase from baseline. However, there is no impact on individuals not currently in a couple regardless of whether they are sexually active or not (columns 3 and 4). Those larger impacts of In Table 6 focusing on the analysis where the couple is the unit of observation, there are significant positive impacts of P4P on the likelihood that the respondent reports that both partners have ever been tested: an increase of 8.6 percentage points, significant at the 10% level, corresponding to a 12 percent increase from baseline (column 1). That increase is especially strong among couples in which one of the partners has been identified as living with HIV/AIDS (discordant couple): the results in column 2 indicate an increase of 14.7 percentage points, significant at the 5% level and representing an 18.14 percent increase from baseline. The increase is lower and not statistically significant for couples, which are not discordant (column
This analysis with the couples as the units of observation confirms that the larger P4P incentives for joint testing especially encourage both partners in the couple to be tested. The impact of P4P on couple testing is particularly strong among discordant couples where one of the partners has been identified as living with HIV/AIDS, encouraging the partners of identified HIV patients to come for HTC.
Conclusions
Our study examines the impact of the national P4P scheme in Rwanda on individual HTC and couple HTC, using data from a prospective experimental design. The results indicate a positive impact of P4P with an increase of 6.1 percentage points in the probability of individuals having ever been tested. This positive impact is concentrated among individuals in couples. The results also indicate larger impacts of P4P on the likelihood that the respondent reports both partners have ever been tested, especially among discordant couples in which only one of the partners is HIV positive.
Our results show significant increase of HTC coverage in the context of a massive scaling-up of HIV services. P4P was implemented in the context of a larger health sector reform and during a period in which HIV/AIDS services, including delivery of ART, were extensively scaled-up. We are not able to identify how this context of increase of HIV service coverage 13 interacted with the P4P program. Arguably a P4P intervention could have even greater impacts in a more static context of HIV service delivery.
Strong encouragement of couple and partner testing is a key component of the P4P
program for HTC in Rwanda. While individual HTC is recognized as the necessary gateway for HIV/AIDS treatment, the prevention benefits of individual HTC remain under discussion (Denison et al., 2008) . Joint couple or partner testing on the other hand appears to have stronger prevention benefits, especially in the case of discordant couples (Allen et al., 2003; Cohen et al., 2011) . However, despite the apparent importance of couple testing for treatment and prevention purposes, there have been few successful experiences of HTC programs reaching couples (Padian et al., 1993; Painter, 2001) . . Furthermore, recent evidence on the effectiveness of ART for prevention of HIV transmission among couples makes this a key intervention of prevention programs in generalized epidemic countries (Dodd et al., 2010; El-Sadr et al., 2010; Wagner et al., 2010) . Recent evidence on the prevention effectiveness of ART points to a 95% protection rate among discordant couples (Cohen et al., 2011) . Our results show that P4P is an effective intervention to target discordant couples for HTC.
Our findings contribute to the growing evidence base that paying health facilities for performance is a feasible and effective method for improving health system performance. More importantly, the role of incentives in P4P is key. Because the comparison facilities' regular budgets were increased by an amount equal to the P4P payment to the treatment group, we were able to isolate the P4P incentive effect from the resource effect. This implies that the same results could not have been achieved by simply increasing the amount of resources without the incentives. * The originally planned evaluation consisted of 18 Phase I health facilities and 18 Phase II health facilities from 7 and 7 districts, respectively. Prior to implementation of the baseline survey, the administrative district boundaries were redrawn in the context of a decentralization effort. As a result, some of the experimental areas were combined with areas that already had NGO P4P schemes. Because P4P could not be "removed" from health facilities that were already implementing the system, and because P4P was managed at the district level, the GoR required that all facilities within those new districts be in the first phase 
Notes:
• P4P: Pay-for-Performance
• HIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus
• HTC: HIV Testing and Counseling
• PMTCT: Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission (of HIV)
• ARV: Antiretroviral drug Note: Standard errors (SE) were cluster-adjusted using districts as clusters. P-Value is for the difference between the treatment and control groups. Note: Standard Errors (SE) were cluster-adjusted using districts as clusters. P-Value is for the difference between treatment and control groups. Note: * * is the estimated effect of P4P controlling for year, and respondent's characteristics including age, gender, age, years of schooling, and log household wealth. Standard Errors (SE) were cluster-adjusted using districts as clusters and all models used a health facility fixed effect. P is the p-value for the difference between treatment and control groups; and %∆ * * * = � � � * 100 , where the baseline mean equals the mean of the dependent variable for the control group at endline (2008). Note: * * is the estimated effect of P4P controlling for year, and respondent's characteristics including age, gender, age, years of schooling, and log household wealth. Standard Errors (SE) were cluster-adjusted using districts as clusters and all models used a health facility fixed effect. P is the p-value for the difference between treatment and control groups; and %∆ * * * = � � � * 100 , where the baseline mean equals the mean of the dependent variable for the control group at endline (2008).
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